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Sometimes it seems there is nothing but horror stories in the Federal government
EDP management. The list of problems is long, and it cuts across all agencies of the
government. Some examples include:
•The World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).
WWMCCS is a twenty year old system which provides real time infor-
mation about the status of military equipment and units. It uses a
world wide network of computers to exchange information. The system
has been plagued by poor software design and reliability problems.
There is little doubt that it cannot fulfill its mission.
•The Social Security System. This information system was a model when
it was first set up in the early 1960's. With a growing workload and
without significant improvements, it has been experiencing major prob-
lems during this decade. Recent attempts to upgrade the system have
resulted in numerous contractual disputes with both legislative and judi-
cial solutions proposed.
•The Navy APADE System. In the early 1970's it became apparent there
were several problems in information processing within the Navy small
purchase procurement process. In 1974, the Navy started a project to
automate procurement (Automation of Procurement and Accounting for
Data Entry). By 1979, the project was still unfinished. Further devel-
opment on the original project was abandoned and a new development
effort was begun which is still underway.
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Numerous solutions to such problems have been proposed. It seems as if the list
of proposed solutions is as long as the list of problems. These solutions include:
1. Contract out more government data processing ("the private sector does it
better").
2. Institution of new rules governing EDP management ("bureaucrats are in-
competent or untrustworthy").
3. The institution of new organizations to manage EDP resources ("empire
building").
4. The establishment of special roving computer-expert groups to correct EDP
problems in Federal agencies ("SWAT teams").
The proposed solutions usually have two things in common. First, they tend to be
inspired by the political goals, both organizational and national, of the person propos-
ing them. Second, they are usually mechanical or procedural changes that focus only
on symptoms of the problem. But such proposed solutions are inadequate since Fed-
eral EDP management problems spring from causes that will not respond to minor ad-
ministrative tinkering. As with everything else in the Federal government, the man-
agement of data processing is imbedded in overall social and political processes.
Decisions concerning Federal EDP management must reflect social and national
political goals. Examples include:
1. Encouragement of competition in the computer industry.
2. Encouragement of small business.
3. Aid to a particular company or sector of the economy.
4. Employment of minorities.
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5. Openness of the government procurement process.
The list is not exhaustive. We do not mean to imply that such external considerations
do not exist in EDP management decisions in the private, sector. They obviously do.
In the private sector, however, the overriding measure of effectiveness is the profitabil-
ity of a single corporation. This is far less complex than the social welfare of a diverse
country of 240 million people.
It is this incorporation of social goals into decision processes that makes govern-
ment EDP management different from the private sector. A Federal government EDP
manager faces a more complex decision problem than a private sector manager faces.
This has a real impact on the decisions that result.
The government decisions are rational, but they are rational within a different
framework. iMechanistic solutions that do not reflect the underlying social and politi-
cal framework are not likely to produce any real long term changes. Long term, effec-
tive solutions must incorporate an understanding of the fundamental social and politi-
cal influences on government computer management. Conversely, such influences
which are adverse to efficient EDP management will have to be changed //efficient
management is desired.
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Characteristics of Federal Data Processing Management
The Federal EDP management scene has several characteristics that are immedi-
ately obvious. These include:
•Complex Social Equity Considerations. Considerations of social equity
are important in decisions affecting data processing as well as in other
areas of government expenditure. Examples are small business and mi-
nority set asides and the desire for computer industry competitiveness in
government procurement.
•Long Lead Times For Projects. The lead time for a system acquisition
can be very long. Eight years is not an uncommon figure in the authors'
experience. In the private sector, eight years would be a complete sys-
tems life cycle from initial concept through operation to replacement.
•Old Computer Systems. One survey of 1,366 medium and large scale
processors found an average age of 7 years. The majority of the instal-
lations use computers that had first been introduced 12 or more years
earlier.
•Fiduciary Management Dominates EDP Management. Government
managers take a fiduciary view rather than a managerial view. Prevent-
ing fraud, waste and abuse of government funds is almost always more
important than using them.
Specialized "One-of-a-Kind" Systems. There is a tendency to do tailor-
made systems instead of relying on off-the-shelf software to perform
functions.
•Lack of Strategic EDP Planning. EDP planning is not an institutional-
ized process in the Federal government. Long range strategic plans for
the use of EDP resources are rare. Systems are organized on a project
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basis. A new EDP system is a project to solve a particular problem and
not as part of an on-going problem solving process.
Some people view these problems as isolated symptoms which can be corrected
merely by solving each one individually. This, however, is fallacious. As we shall show
below, these are not isolated symptoms, but are interdependent characteristics of the
political processes surrounding Federal EDP management. Any solution to the prob-
lems of Federal EDP management must address the political considerations which gen-
erate them. Solutions not considering this fundamental aspect of Federal EDP man-
agement will surely fail.
As an example, consider the case of the Social Security System's computers. This
was a model system when first installed in the 1960's, but, until recently, little was done
to update the system. For years, the system has been teetering on the edge of disaster.
Congress authorized new computers in an upgrade that is conservatively estimated at
$479 million. Congress balked at an all-IBM installation. So, one plan was devised to
split the computer system into seven sections so that other companies could bid on the
equipment more readily.
No rational EDP manager would consider such a solution. The problems of run-
ning a seven-way mixed shop would drive costs through the ceiling. In setting these
requirements Congress was not -looking at the problem from the point of view of EDP
management. They focused on the issue of social equity. Additionally, standardizing
on IBM makes the computer industry less competitive. An equipment decision of this
size could spell the difference between survival and bankruptcy for some companies.
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These companies are somebody's constituents. Such considerations are clearly not rel-
evant for a private sector decision maker.
Sorting out these political issues takes time and is the major contributor to the
long procurement lead times found in government. Political negotiating must take
place before we can arrive at a solution accepted as fair by all. Government procure-
ment processes have institutionalized these political negotiations into a complex com-
petitive bidding system which is costly to both government and vendors. As an exam-
ple, the requirement that systems undergo extensive benchmarking is costly in both
construction and analysis of the benchmarks. While benchmarks give an air of fairness
to the selection process, they do little to guarantee selection of the best possible sys-
tem.
These considerations of social equity and diverse goals within the government
make for complex systems with long lead times. An example is the area of payroll sys-
tems. Payrolls are common EDP applications. The first true data processing program
was a payroll system constructed at General Electric in 1954. By now, we should have
wide experience with payrolls, yet the government has always had problems in the
construction of payroll systems. Let's see why this is true.
Consider a hypothetical Navy payroll situation. The Navy operates a centralized
payroll system out of Cleveland. Suppose that we have a sailor who is qualified as a
diver but who normally holds a desk job in Naples, Italy. While working as a diver, he
is eligible for hazardous duty pay. Suppose additionally that he does three days special
duty as a diver, which affects his pay for the period in question. Because he is in Italy,
we have a further complication. To ease currency exchange problems, a portion of his
-6
salary is paid in Italian lira at the current exchange rate. To compute his paycheck,
the center in Cleveland must receive timely notification of his three days duty as a div-
er, perform the currency exchange calculations, compute his paycheck, and get it to
him in Naples.
Compound this problem with many similar local rules and pay rates and you begin
to see the reason for the complexity of government EDP systems. Notice that all the
rules are individually rational. Incentive pay for special duty is a long-accepted com-
promise for complex issues in military pay rates. The currency exchange rules make
for easier economic relations with other governments.
The result from an EDP management view is an administrative nightmare. There
are volumes of complex, constantly changing rules that must be accommodated in de-
signing and maintaining such systems. Long lead times for such systems are not sur-
prising. The surprising thing is that the government actually does finish some systems.
Piecemeal rationality has led to large scale irrationality. Although these problems also
exist in the private sector, they are worse in the Federal government because of the size
of systems and the complex system interrelationships.
These are some of the factors causing long lead times in system design and imple-
mentation. Long lead times further add to the problem of outdated computer systems.
By private sector standards, much of the government's computer inventory has outlived
its economic usefulness. The government purchases most of its computer equipment.
The average age of general purpose computers in government service is about seven
years. Figure 1 shows the distribution of ages. Keep in mind that this seven years is
the age of the equipment. The technologies are at least two to three years older.
In the private sector it is cheaper to replace the equipment than to continue pay-
ing the costs to operate it. From the point of view of a government manager, however,
this is not true. This is because the government manager perceives a different set of
costs than a private sector manager. In the government, a major cost of a new system
is the cost of justifying the replacement of the old system. Because of the extensive
system of checks and balances required for spending public money, this justification
involves much administrative time and expense. The manager must divert a large share
of the staffs energies into tedious paperwork to meet the requirements of the checks
and balances. While doing this, they are also supposed to be running the old system.
Hence, for a Federal EDP manager, a major cost of a new system is the administrative
cost paid to justify it. This administrative cost is hard to compute explicitly, but it is
real and it is high. It results in the true cost of replacement of the government system
being much higher than for a similar system in the private sector.
This extensive justification process makes the economic life of systems in the Fed-
eral government much longer than those in the private sector. Most Federal managers
who have been through this process hope that they will retire before their new system
must be replaced. It is small wonder that most managers opt for making small im-
provements to outdated systems instead of trying to replace them.
This brings us to tailor-made systems. Many government computer systems are
one-of-a-kind systems designed for a particular application or organization. Govern-
ment computer shops lag behind similar shops in the private sector in the use of off-
the-shelf software and software tools. Many critics cite this as an area where govern-
ment computer managers can improve productivity. A 1980 report by the General
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Accounting Office recommended using new software technology tools to speed up sys-
tem development. Examples of such tools include program generators, program librar-
ies, data base systems, preprocessor packages, fourth generation retrieval languages,
and so on. There is little doubt that these tools can improve productivity dramatically.
In government installations, it is not uncommon to find one-of-a-kind systems ex-
isting that accomplish the functions of off-the-shelf software tools. Such systems op-
erate as local systems programs. When the manufacturer of the computer system pro-
vides a new software release, the users must update their locally-produced systems
programs if they wish to take advantage of the new capabilities.
As an example, the Navy Supply Corps has systems which use Navy-written data-
base management modules. These provide a few, but by no means all, of the features
found in commercial database management systems. The cost of updating these data-
base systems is large. Their unique features have found their way into many of the
programs that the Supply Corps uses to process its data. Maintaining these unique
systems and the applications software that uses them is costly, since the Supply Corps
has about 20 million lines of COBOL code to maintain.
Have government managers developed this unique software because they are unin-
formed about private sector developments? No, they are just not in a position where
they can take advantage of these systems. Most of the productivity-enhancing soft-
ware (database management systems, fourth generation languages, etc.) runs only on
IBM compatible hardware. The social equity considerations in procurement keep gov-
ernment managers off IBM hardware. It is not unreasonable that most of this soft-
ware is restricted to IBM compatible machines. IBM has the major hardware market
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share for customers of this type of software. However, Figure 2 shows the distribution
of computer equipment by manufacturer for government systems costing more than
$50,000. IBM has a little less than 12 percent of the market. A comparable graph for
the private sector would show at least a 60 percent market share for IBM in this cat-
egory.
The cost-oriented management view taken in the government also contributes to
the tendency toward one-of-a-kind systems. In government spending, all dollars are
not the same. It is usually possible to obtain funds to hire programmers to make mar-
ginal improvements to an old system, but it may be difficult to use those funds to buy
new equipment. Or, if the dollars are there, as in the Social Security case, the process
may dissolve into an interminable political battle over how to divide them up. In such
a world, one-of-a-kind systems are rational behavior.
The last of our characterizations of Federal EDP management is that the strategic
planning process is weak. There is now general acceptance in the private sector of the
necessity of top management involvement in strategic planning in order to have suc-
cessful information systems. However, in the Federal government, we have problems
of continuity in top management that private industry does not have.
The entire top management structure of government can change every four years.
It might be argued that this should not be a problem. After all, corporate management
teams change frequently as well, and they are still able to set up strategic planning
procedures. But, the process by which corporate management changes is different. In
government, a new management team comes to power by running against the policies
of the old team. By implication, the old team is incompetent, so replacement is the
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only cure. This is analogous to an unfriendly corporate takeover. In most corporate
management changes, however, the new management team has usually had a mentor
relationship with the old team. Change is more gradual, and there is much greater
continuity in policies and procedures. The new management team understands those
policies and the processes by which they were formed. They do not require the setup
time that a new government administration requires before they can become fully
functional.
The result is that planning, if any, is dependent on individual management styles.
It is not a routine procedure in the organization. It may be that the current incumbent
in a job sees a need for long range planning and pursues it. His successor is unfamiliar
with the situation and may have a different set of priorities. The next manager often
abandons these planning processes before they can have any effect. In our observa-
tions, this happens more often than not. Since mentor relationships and procedure-
based planning are more common in the private sector, change is more orderly. A fur-
ther difficulty here is that the turnover in high-level government management is much
higher than in the private sector. But even if the rate of management turnover were
the same in both sectors, the long range planning process would still be more difficult
.
to establish in government.
Outside observers looking at this list often conclude that government EDP man-
agers must be incompetent. Americans tend to be disdainful of government anyway, so
this is a conclusion that is easily reinforced. The solutions in this view are simple:
1. Get new computer equipment.
2. Throw out the incompetents responsible for the long lead times.
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3. Hire professionally-oriented EDP management.
4. Concentrate on better measures of efficiency such as those used in the pri-
vate sector.
5. Do away with special purpose systems and buy ofT-the-shelf.
6. Set up groups responsible for long term strategic EDP planning.
Interestingly enough, one hears these proposals from government employees about
as often as from the private sector. Government EDP managers even share the idea
that they, or at least some of their colleagues, must be incompetent managers. How
else could things be in such a mess?
It is our observation that government EDP managers are not incompetents.
Those we have dealt with are at least as good as their counterparts in the private sec-
tor. They are rational people responding rationally to a different set of ground rules
than those which exist outside government. Deeply held values in society at large
generate these ground rules, and they will not be changed by any of the solutions sug-
gested above. The proposed solutions deal with symptoms and not causes. The solu-




In 1982, President Reagan established the President's Private Sector Survey on
Cost Control (PPSSCC) with J. Peter Grace as the Chairman of its Executive Commit-
tee. The PPSSCC, informally known as the Grace Commission, was charged with
studying improvements in government operations. It tried to apply private sector
management techniques to the Federal government and to recommend areas of mana-
gerial improvement and cost savings. One task, force of the Grace Commission exam-
ined Automated Data Processing/Office Automation. Its report was released in Sep-
tember 1983[1].
The major findings and recommendations of the report were:
•A Federal Information Resource Manager should oversee EDP/OA
throughout the government.
•A qualified Senior Executive Service career professional should oversee
EDP/OA management at each agency.
•The General Services Administration (GSA) should grant agencies more
procurement authority and enhance GSA technical assistance.
•Agencies should upgrade or replace uneconomic and obsolete EDP/OA
systems.
•Teleprocessing (TP) costs should be documented separately and TP net-
works should be shared.
•Government should improve management of OA and emphasize its use
for managerial/professional personnel.
•Improve salaries and hiring procedures for EDP personnel.
13-
The overall net savings from these recommendations were projected at $29.5 billion
over three years.
We do not intend to discuss the details of these recommendations since that is a
topic all to itself, but it is easy to see the similarities between these recommendations
and the proposed solutions presented in the section above. Unfortunately, it appears
that none of these recommendations addresses the underlying political processes which
created the problems. Consequently, we are skeptical on two counts. First, can these
recommendations save the amounts projected? Second, can most of these recommen-
dations ever be implemented?
We are not alone in our pessimism about the projected savings. The Congression-
al Budget Office examined the major proposals (including EDP), and reduced the pro-
jected savings by approximately 70 percent[2]. The fundamental problem with most of
the Grace Commission proposals, including those for EDP and office automation, is
that they do not recognize that the Federal government is not the private sector. Al-
though several recommendations will provide some savings, most of those claiming big
dollar savings are not implementable. They do not anticipate and alleviate the national
political problems they would generate. So what can be done?
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Living With the System
The situation facing the Federal government EDP manager is not enviable. The
manager must manage resources efficiently while operating within constraints defined
by the political process. Major tradeoffs of resources are not the manager's to make.
At the aggregate level, these tradeoffs are made by the political process, leaving the
manager little room for further maneuver. There is little likelihood that the rules will
be changed. They cover many areas of government outside EDP management. The
political processes that generated these rules were developed over many years of com-
promise and negotiation. The stakes are too large for widespread, rapid change.
There are developments taking place in government that may make the political
tradeoff process less costly. Whether they will succeed is uncertain. One approach is
to lengthen the life cycle of a system. This seems bizarre at first glance since a major
problem is that the Federal EDP system life cycle is already too long. But along with
the longer life cycle comes a broader definition of a system. The new approach sensi-
bly defines the information system by the functions it performs. The hardware and
software performing the functions become the means not the ends. The procurement
contract sets specific performance goals for these functions. If an increased workload
means that these goals are not met, more equipment is purchased. It is not necessary
to go through an entire procurement justification. Since hardware types are not speci-
fied in the contract, it is possible for the vendor to install newer equipment if this is the
cheapest way to meet performance goals. If the vendor cannot fulfill these goals at
certain evaluation points, then the government can get another vendor.
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Initially, this might seem to offer some relief from the long lead times. The lead
time for negotiating the initial contract is as long as ever. Once the political tradeoffs
are made, however, they last for, say, the twenty-five year life of the contract. At least
this is the theory. In fact, there are likely to be problems. The government has to
worry about possible problems of non-performance or the possibility of getting a better
deal elsewhere. The twenty-five year contract can be up for grabs every eight years. If
the stakes are large enough, it will be worthwhile for somebody to reopen the issue.
This means a whole new round of political tradeoffs and negotiations.
The other possibility is to contract out EDP services. Suppliers of EDP services
can be selected by competitive bid. The suppliers can decide the cheapest means of de-
livering the services. Presumably, this would short circuit the political problems men-
tioned earlier--at least suppliers of EDP services in the private sector think so. Actual-
ly, this could just be a case of moving the battle to a different field or of just changing
the rules slightly. For decisions of this magnitude, there will still be a complicated and
lengthy selection process for the supplier of the services. There will still be politically-
inspired rules that will constrain the supplier of EDP services.
This is likely to continue if most suppliers of contract EDP services are small. So
.
far, the stakes involved are not large. It is not worth initiating political battles for such
small returns. However, suppose that the government were to begin contracting out
large scale EDP services such as Social Security or selected administrative activities of
the Department of Defense. In that case, the return would be worth the fight.
One could expect then that the outside contractors would become fully subject to
the political process. When that happened, their advantage over government-run EDP
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operations would diminish accordingly. They would become government data process-
ing operations under another name. Hence, contracting out EDP services is likely to
provide some short term relief, but, as the stakes involved- get larger, it is reasonable to
expect the political process to intrude here as well.
Relief from several of these problems has recently come from the introduction and
use of microcomputers. Users have been able to move work from mainframes to
microcomputers. However, most of this work has been internal government adminis-
trative functions and not full-service production operations of the problem agencies.
Even with rapid technological changes, it is difficult to envision Social Security pro-
duction operations being placed on a network of micros. Even if this occurred, the
procurement of large quantities of micros involving large dollar contracts will create
the same problems discussed earlier. So, while micros have helped, they cannot solve
all problems.
Conclusions
The basic problem with Federal EDP management is not the quality of manage-
ment. The problem is that the systems acquisition and design processes are naturally
influenced by larger political goals. The acquisition process was designed by Congress,
the Executive Branch, and industry, and it has benefits for all. No one group has cus-
tody of the acquisition process, and there are many dysfunctional incentives built into
it. Any participant can slow the process down, but no group has any incentive to fight
to make the process more efficient. It is one more example of Bret Harte's old adage
that nobody shoulders a rifle in defense of a boarding house. About the only forces
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keeping the system from reaching total chaos are the public service norms emphasized
in government employment. Somehow, the work gets done.
The government could speed up the computer acquisition process. It could decide
that the process is an inappropriate means to pursue some social goals. In particular,
the government should give up trying to regulate the computer industry through the
government equipment acquisition process. Considering the impact on the govern-
ment's administrative systems, this strategy is not cost effective. If the government
wants to regulate the industry, it should do so directly through the Antitrust Division
of the Justice Department, the Federal Trade Commission, or by encouraging private
lawsuits. We realize there is little hope of this kind of recommendation being adopted.
Antitrust policies are popular with both the public and businesses whose competitors
may be hampered by vigorous antitrust enforcement.
The systems design problem is not easily handled either. Government computer
systems are in trouble because they are large and complex. This is, in part, a reflection
of the social system in which they are imbedded. The systems are large because the
government deals with large real world problems. The complexity comes out of the
political process.
We have many different groups competing in the political process. This competi-
tion generates complicated political tradeoffs. Government computer systems, as do
other governmental components, merely reflect these tradeoffs. If we were a more ho-
mogeneous country such as Japan, perhaps we could get by with simpler systems, but
we are not. Congress and the public at large need to appreciate the impact of their
demands on the systems that service their demands. If we want simpler, more cost ef-
fective systems, we will have to sacrifice some of the complexity of our demands.
- 18-
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Data Processing/Office Automation," U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983.
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